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Is market value-based residual income a superior performance measure  
compared to book value-based residual income? 
 
Abstract 
With the increasing use of residual income-based concepts of performance measurement, 
significantly different formulas are proposed for calculating both the firm’s operating profit 
as well as its cost of capital. On the one hand, there is the traditional book value-based ap-
proach (EVA), on the other hand there are market value-based approaches, in which either 
only the cost of capital (REVA) or both cost of capital and the firm’s operating profit be-
fore interest (residual economic income, REI) are determined by using market values.  
In our paper, we compare the advantages and disadvantages of these different types of 
residual income measurement. Our results are the following. First, we show that REVA 
compared to EVA might lead to underinvestment in projects with a strictly positive net pre-
sent value as well as to overinvestment in projects with a strictly negative net present value 
even if principal and agent discount a project’s income stream at the same rate. Second, we 
show that a proposition to base incentives on strictly positive EVA targets derived from an 
observed Market Value Added (MVA) equals the application of a REVA-type performance 
measure and, therefore, might be afflicted with the same deficiencies.  
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Value Added, Economic Income, Incentives 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, different concepts of residual income measurement have been widely dis-
cussed within the field of value-based management in both academic research and corporate 
practice. The objective has been to define a performance measure that strictly motivates an 
agent to implement all available investment projects with a non-negative net present value. 
Typical assumptions under which these types of performance measurement are discussed are 
the existence of unrestricted financial means at a given cost of capital and information asym-
metry between the principal and the agent with regard to the net present value of the invest-
ment projects chosen by the agent.  
Generally, residual income is measured by deducting a capital charge from the firm’s 
profit. The exact way on how either profit or cost of capital is measured, is not specified at all. 
The only crucial assumption made in most cases is that the sum of accrued earnings measuring 
the firm’s operating profit equals the sum of cash flows from operating and financing activi-
ties. In that case, Preinreich (1937) and Lücke (1955) have shown that the sum of discounted 
residual income resulting from a given investment project is equal to the project’s net present 
value. Consequently, residual income measurement leads to an equivalent project choice com-
pared to decision-making based on a project cash flows: the value of the discounted residual 
income stream equals the project’s net present value.  
Among the many concepts of residual income measurement that have been discussed in 
previous years (Bromwich/Walker, 1999), the varying use of book values versus market val-
ues in determining the firm’s profit and/or the capital charge is a striking difference: 
  book value-based measurement of both profit and capital charge, e.g. Stern Stewart’s 
Economic Value Added (EVA) (see Stewart, 1991; Stewart, 1994; Stern/Shiely/Ross, 
2001), 
 
 book value-based profit measurement, market value-based measurement of capital 
charge, e.g. Refined Economic Value Added (REVA) (see Bacidore et al., 1997) 
 
 market value-based profit measurement of both profit and capital charge, i.e. residual 
economic income (REI). 
In our paper , we analyze the question whether market-based residual income – either as 
REVA or as REI – is superior to the commonly used book-value based approach (EVA). Our 
discussion is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview on EVA, REVA and 
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REI as different types of residual income-based performance measurement. In section 3, we 
give a detailed analysis on the information provided by these performance measures. In sec-
tion 4, we focus more closely on the incentive effects of REVA vs. EVA. We show that 
REVA could result in either underinvestment in projects with a positive net present value or 
overinvestment in projects with a negative net present value, both compared to EVA. In sec-
tion 5 we discuss the possibility of using the MVA to derive EVA targets for investment cen-
ters. We prove that with an infinite horizon these targets equal the application of REVA. Sec-
tion 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Residual income-based performance measurement 
Of all approaches to residual income-based performance measurement, Stern Stewart’s Eco-
nomic Value Added (EVA) has gained the most attention in economic practice. Its underlying 
philosophy is intuitively evident. Since investors require a return as a compensation for pro-
viding funds and bearing business risk, the firm’s operating profit must exceed the cost of 
capital to create wealth for the shareholders. Therefore, Stern Stewart defines EVA as NOPAT 
less a capital charge that reflects the cost of capital: 
BV
t
BV
tt IrNOPATEVA 1)1(    
NOPAT
 BV
t is the net operating profit after adjusted taxes in period t, r is the cost of capital, 
usually calculated as weighted average cost of capital (WACC), and I
BV
t-1 represents the firm’s 
gross investment (assets) at the beginning of period t. Both net operating profit and the firm’s 
gross investment are accounted for based on book values, i.e. I represents the cash outflows 
from a firm’s investment after depreciation and impairment and NOPAT represents the 
changes in a firm’s equity including (entity approach) the firm’s interest payments.  
A strong link can be established between future EVAs and the value of the firm by defining 
the present value of all future EVAs as Market Value Added (MVA): The sum of book value 
based investment I
BV
 and MVA formally equals the overall market value of the firm calculated 
on an estimated stream of cash flows. 
To “eliminate various accounting distortions” (Stern/Shiely/Ross, 2001, p. 20) under an 
EVA regime, in many cases income statement and balance sheet are subject to various adjust-
ments in deriving NOPAT and Capital, converting the underlying measurement from a firm’s 
accounting model to the more appropriate economic model. The objectives of these adjust-
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ments are e.g. to capture all sources of financing (e.g. leases) or to eliminate accounting con-
servatism (e.g. capitalization of R&D expenses). Although fair values are introduced in some 
cases both in profit measurement as well as in determining the level of investment, even after 
Stern Stewart’s accounting adjustments a substantial part of the firm’s original goodwill ac-
counting for the difference in book value of the firm’s assets and its market value is usually 
not included in the investment I
BV
 . 
Critics of Stern Stewart’s EVA argue that the book value-based EVA measurement frame-
work does not capture the investors’ opportunity costs as EVA does not take into account that 
investors expect a return on the market value of the firm. If investors sell the firm for its mar-
ket value and invest their proceeds in assets identical in risk, they could expect to earn a return 
equal to the firm’s WACC on the firm’s overall market value and not only on the book values 
of the firm’s investment shown in the balance sheet. Consequently, the capital charge has to 
reflect this opportunity cost of investors (Richter/Honold, 2000). 
Mainly to overcome this shortcoming of EVA, Bacidore et al. (1997) have suggested to re-
place it by a measure they named REVA (Refined Economic Value Added). They define 
REVA as 
MV
t
BV
tt IrNOPATREVA 1)2(    
In comparison to EVA the basis for the capital charge is the market value of the firm I
MV
t-1 
rather than (adjusted) book values I
BV
t-1 of its assets. Compared to EVA, REVA results in a 
higher capital charge, if the firm’s market value exceeds the adjusted book values of its assets, 
and vice versa. Until now the REVA approach has not gained the popularity of EVA, but we 
have knowledge of some companies applying it successfully. In order to avoid recalculation of 
the market value every year they freeze the MVA for several years and alter book values ac-
cording to the investments net of depreciation undertaken during this period. 
Comparing REVA to EVA, REVA has a severe pitfall as any changes in market value I
MV
t-1 
are included into the capital charge, but not in a corresponding measure into the net operating 
profit NOPAT
BV
1. Only if these changes are realized in the accounting accruals, e.g. by an im-
pairment of assets, both profit measurement and capital charge do match under an REVA re-
gime. 
This pitfall is avoided by residual economic income (REI) as a third type of residual in-
come-based performance measurement. REI is – in contrast to EVA and REVA – entirely 
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based on market values. Its theoretical foundation is the concept of economic income (EI) 
which has been discussed in economic theory for a long time (Fisher, 1906; Hicks, 1946). The 
economic income of a given period t is defined as the change in equity value of the firm plus 
net cash flows distributed to its shareholders during this period. This definition ensures that 
the any changes in a firm’s cash flow profile determining its overall market value are captured 
in a comprehensive way. Deduction a capital charge from economic income then leads to re-
sidual economic income (REI). As in the REVA approach, the capital charge reflects inves-
tor’s full opportunity cost, because the capital charge is calculated on the basis of the market 
value of equity. Summarized, REI is defined as follows: 
1111  and with )3(       t
MV
tttt
MV
t
MV
t
MV
tt VICFVVNOPATIrNOPATREI  
with Vt representing the sum of discounted (free) cash flows CF at the end of period t.  
From a theoretical ex ante perspective, REI is the best performance measure, since it captures 
all present and future cash flows resulting from managerial activities during a given period t 
(Hax, 1989). What makes REI inappropriate for incentive purpose is the subjectivity in calcu-
lation of the firm’s market value in case of non-listed firms. Nevertheless, REI constitutes the 
benchmark for our following discussion of residual income concepts. 
3 Information content of REI, REVA, and EVA 
In this section, we discuss the information content of the three concepts of residual income 
measurement outlined in the previous section. In other words, we formalize in how far a firm’s 
economic periodic performance is reflected by these performance measures.  
As indicated in section 2, the benchmark solution is REI, as it is based on economic income 
and therefore captures all present and future cash flows induced by managerial decisions. 
Starting with the analysis of the firm’s economic income, it can be exhaustively decomposed 
into three effects: time effect, investment effect, and information effect (Laux, 1999, pp. 166-
173; Neus, 1998, pp. 341-346). These effects can be illustrated, if the cash flows CFt of any 
period t that is included into the measurement of economic income at a given time is split into 
three components: 
p
t
inv
t
p
tt CFCFCFCF )4(  
CFt
p
 represents the cash flows that have been planned for t in t-1. CFt
inv
 represents the cash 
flows that result from new investment projects that have been undergone during the period, 
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and  CFt
p
 = CFt
p
 - CFt
R
 is difference between the planned cash flows CFt
p
 and the realized 
cash flows CFt
R
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Equation (4) together with (5) can be restated as 
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Note that any change in a firm’s market value can be attributed to one of the three effects 
which are have to be explored in further detail.  
(1) The time effect explains the component of economic income, that simply results from 
the time elapsed from the beginning to the end of the period. The following example may il-
lustrate this point: A firm has a WACC of 10% and consists of one asset only from which a 
one time cash flow of 100 is expected in period 3. At the beginning of the period the present 
value of the firm is 75.13, at the end it is 82.64. Consequently, the economic income is 7.51 in 
this period. It equals exactly the interest gained on the firm’s market value at the beginning of 
the period, if expectations of future cash flows and interest rates remain unchanged as as-
sumed in our example.  
Proposition: 
p
t
p
t
p
t
p
t VrVCFV 11    
Proof:  The equation’s left hand side can easily be restated so that the following holds 
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  q.e.d. 
The concept of time value of money gives an explanation for the time effect. Since people 
normally prefer earlier cash flows to later ones, the situation at the end of the period is an im-
provement compared to the beginning of this period. This improvement is identical to the in-
terest that investors would have gained, if they had sold the firm for its market value at the be-
ginning of the period and had invested the proceeds at the capital market (provided that the 
discount rate equals the rate of return on the capital market). As the time effect therefore sim-
ply results from the market valuation process, it is not stipulated by the firm’s economic ac-
tivities during that period. 
(2) To define the investment effect, we assume that all management decisions have conse-
quences on present and future cash flows. Typically, investment decisions result in an imme-
diate cash outflow and additional cash inflows in the same and/or future periods. Economic 
income increases or decreases by the net effect of these cash flows – the net present value. 
Therefore, we define the component of economic income that is causally related to a firm’s 
managerial decision making as the investment effect. It may be interpreted as an indicator for 
the quality of the decisions undertaken by the management within a certain period of time. 
(3) In addition to pure time elapse and management decisions, changes of expectations on 
cash flows. This is called the information effect, because it represents the component of eco-
nomic income that can be attributed to new or revised information about the firm’s prospects. 
On closer inspection the information effect comprises two aspects: First, economic income re-
sults from the difference between expected cash flows for the current period and those actually 
realized. Secondly, it reflects the change of the firm’s market value within the period as a con-
 - 7 - 
 
sequence of a revised projection of future cash flows at period end due to additional informa-
tion. 
The extent to which these effects are incorporated in the approaches to residual income 
measurement discussed in the previous section depends on their reliance on the market value 
of the firm instead of book values of its assets. 
Since REI is entirely based on the firm’s market value, the time effect is neutralized in the 
REI approach by deducting the capital charge calculated on a market value-basis so that the 
remaining residual economic income (i.e. REI) is confined to investment effect and informa-
tion effect (r·V
p
t-1 = r·I
MV
t-1). 
Eliminating the time effect may be interpreted as setting a hurdle that reflects the opportu-
nity costs of investors: in the absence of any other effects, REI is zero if and only if this hurdle 
is met and thus the investors’ opportunity costs have been realized. If managers undertake new 
investment projects they increase or decrease the REI by the NPV of these new investment 
projects, because REI as an entirely market value-based measure does reflect any change in 
expectations of future cash flows immediately and fully.  
With respect to eliminating the time effect component from periodic income REVA takes 
investor’s opportunity costs into account to the same extent as REI does, because in the REVA 
approach the capital charge is calculated on the basis of the firm’s market value as well. But 
due to its hybrid character (NOPAT based on book values, capital charge based on market 
value) REVA differs from REI when it comes to a change in expectations about future cash 
flows of the firm either due to new investment projects or because of new or revised informa-
tion. In both cases the change in the firm’s market value results in a higher or lower capital 
charge from the following period on. In addition to the impact on the capital charge, REVA is 
affected by new investment projects insofar, as they have an impact on the current period’s 
NOPAT.  
The impact on NOPAT consists of additional net cash flows less depreciation induced by 
the new investment projects. The same holds for new information: the impact on the NOPAT 
is confined to the impact this information has on cash flows of the current period. Thus, in-
formation that influences future cash flows has impact on current NOPAT only with regards to 
impairments. Both investment effect and information effect are therefore incorporated in 
REVA in a very rudimentary way due to the book value basis in calculating NOPAT. This re-
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sults in a mismatch of the three effects in REVA: While the time effect is eliminated com-
pletely (as an expression of investor’s opportunity costs), the other effects are included in pe-
riodic income only partially. 
Since NOPAT is not only a component of REVA but of EVA as well, the argument concerning 
the impact new information and additional investments have on NOPAT holds for EVA in ex-
act the same manner: information effect and investment effect influence NOPAT only insofar, 
as the NOPAT (cash flows net of depreciation) of the current period changes. But EVA differs 
from REVA in calculating the capital charge by using book values as a calculation basis in-
stead of market values, which means that capital charge in EVA is an incomplete compensa-
tion of the time effect of economic income. Thus, EVA does not incorporate the entire oppor-
tunity costs investor’s face when investing in a firm. 
4 Incentive effects of residual income-based performance measurement 
In section 3, REI has been characterized as the performance measure that captures the con-
sequences of a firm’s periodic economic performance regarding managerial project implemen-
tation in a comprehensive way.  
Unfortunately, residual income measurement does not provide a clear signal on managerial 
decision-making. More specifically, a positive (negative) residual economic income does not 
indicate whether projects with positive (negative) net present value have been implemented, as 
the investment effect e.g. of a project with positive net present value might be wholly or at 
least partially set of (or reinforced) by a modification of expectations on the cash flow profile 
of projects implemented in earlier periods. As the signals of both investment effect and infor-
mation effect can be observed only in a combined way, REI is clearly not suited for manage-
ment incentive purposes under asymmetric information with regards to managerial project im-
plementation. 
This shortcoming is even reinforced if the manager whose economic performance is to be 
measured may even influence the expectations on future cash flows either by giving discre-
tionary signals to the capital markets or by being directly asked to provide estimations on the 
firm’s cash flow profile.  
For this reason, in corporate practice management compensation schemes rely usually on 
book value-based residual income, such as Stern Stewart’s EVA. It can easily be shown (see 
Reichelstein, 1997, that basically EVA leads to a first best level of investment if unrestricted 
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financial means are available, i.e. every project with non-negative NPV is to be implemented, 
if principal and agent use the same discount rate r to evaluate future streams of income, and if 
there is no other source of disutility, e.g. some cost of effort, which the agent is subject to. 
Proposition: If the agent can be provided with unrestricted financial means at a rate r, if 
principal and agent use the same discount rate r to evaluate future streams of 
income, and if there is no other source of disutility, e.g. some cost of effort, 
which the agent is subject to, then an EVA-based linear incentive scheme leads 
to the first-best level of investment. 
Proof:  If the principal sets the level of investment I* in t = 0 we have 
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  As Preinreich (1937) and Lücke (1955) have shown that  
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Even though EVA leads to the first-best investment level, several authors (Baciodore et al., 
1997, Richter/Honold, 2000) criticize that the book value-based capital charge deducted from 
NOPAT under an EVA regime does not reflect the investors’ opportunity costs which have to 
be calculated on a market value basis. The reasoning behind this argument is the following: 
Investors could sell the firm at any point of time and invest their proceeds in the capital mar-
ket. In this case they could expect a return on the market value of the firm and not on the book 
values only as the EVA approach assumes implicitly when calculating the capital charge on 
the book value of the firm’s assets. Therefore, EVA does not reflect the full opportunity costs 
investors face when investing their funds in the firm. 
In addition to this argument to be found in economic literature, mainly practicioners argue 
that EVA does lack comparability in case of identical businesses with different book values of 
their respective investments. For example, a firm consists of two divisions identical with re-
spect to future cash flows: one owns a new plant and machinery while the other has an old 
plant and machinery. Due to differences in the assets book value the EVA of these divisions 
varies significantly. This would cause problems in measuring and judging the performance of 
these two divisions and their management for comparison purpose. Another example would be 
a difference between divisions with respect to the internal vs. external growth strategies in the 
past. As a consequence of external growth in the past acquired goodwill is part of the capital in 
these division while other divisions – although yielding the same future cash flows – have a 
small asset base. Thus, the EVAs of the division without acquired goodwill exceeds the EVA 
of other divisions due to a lower capital charge. 
The REVA approach of residual income seems to provide an elegant solution for both as-
pects mentioned: Calculating the capital charge on a market value-basis captures investor’s 
opportunity costs correctly and it uncouples the capital charge from the age of a division’s as-
sets and from the extent to which acquired goodwill is part of the division’s assets. 
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As a consequence of using REVA as a measure for periodic performance and as a basis for 
management compensation, managers are prompted to judge new projects by the effect these 
projects have on REVA. It will be illustrated below, that using REVA as a performance meas-
ure instead of EVA does not lead to a first best level of investment: REVA could induce man-
agers to approve value destructing investment projects on the one hand, and it could prevent 
them from investing in value creating projects on the other hand. Consequently, REVA lacks 
superiority in comparison to EVA when it comes to motivating managers to implement all 
available investment projects with positive net present value only.  
The dysfunctional effects of a REVA regime can easily be seen if the condition for the op-
timal investment level I
REVA
 is derived which is 
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Condition (8) shows that the optimal level of investment under REVA / EVA differs depend-
ing on the capital charge that is calculated. There may be projects with a negative net present 
value in which the reduced capital charge offsets the lower cash flow profile so that the sum of 
discounted REVA is positive whereas the project’s net present value is negative. On the other 
hand, projects with a positive net present value may be allocated an overrated capital charge 
under a REVA regime which offsets the high cash flow profile so that the sum of discounted 
REVA is negative. 
These effects will be illustrated by the following examples. 
The example shows two investment projects (A, see Exhibit 1, and B, see Exhibit 2) with a 
necessary cash outlay of 236.25 in period 0 for each project.  
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0 1 2 3 4 5
Investment -236,25
Book Value 236,25 189,00 141,75 94,50 47,25 0,00
OCF 16,74 16,74 16,74 167,44 167,44
Depreciation -47,25 -47,25 -47,25 -47,25 -47,25
NOPAT -30,51 -30,51 -30,51 120,19 120,19
Capital Charge (BV) 23,63 18,90 14,18 9,45 4,73
EVA 0,00 -54,13 -49,41 -44,68 110,74 115,47
Discounted EVA (MVA) 23,72 80,22 137,65 196,10 104,97 0,00
Economic Income 23,72 26,00 26,92 27,94 29,06 15,22
Economic Capital Charge 0,00 26,00 26,92 27,94 29,06 15,22
REI 23,72 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
REVA -56,50 -57,43 -58,45 91,13 104,97
Discounted REVA -15,32 39,65 101,05 169,60 95,43 0,00  
Exhibit 1 (Project A) 
While project A has a slightly positive MVA, i.e. net present value of 23.75, B has a negative 
MVA, i.e. net present value of –7.77. Obviously, from a shareholder’s point of view, manag-
ers should approve project A and reject project B.  
0 1 2 3 4 5
Investment -236,25
Book Value 236,25 189,00 141,75 94,50 47,25 0,00
OCF 117,21 117,21 16,74 16,74 1,67
Depreciation -47,25 -47,25 -47,25 -47,25 -47,25
NOPAT 69,96 69,96 -30,51 -30,51 -45,58
Capital Charge (BV) 23,63 18,90 14,18 9,45 4,73
EVA 0,00 46,33 51,06 -44,68 -39,96 -50,30
Discounted EVA (MVA) -7,77 -54,89 -111,43 -77,89 -45,73 0,00
Economic Income -7,77 22,85 13,41 3,03 1,66 0,15
Economic Capital Charge 0,00 22,85 13,41 3,03 1,66 0,15
REI -7,77 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
REVA 47,11 56,55 -33,54 -32,17 -45,73
Discounted REVA 14,00 -31,71 -91,43 -67,03 -41,57 0,00  
Exhibit 2 (Project B) 
If REVA is used for management compensation, exactly the opposite would happen: Due to a 
discounted REVA of –15.32 regarding A and of 14,00 regarding B managers would reject the 
value-creating project A and undertake project B resulting in a shareholder wealth destruction 
totalling 7.77 + 23.72 = 31.47. This means that a REVA-based compensation scheme does not 
ensure that managers implement all value creating investment projects and reject investments. 
5 EVA targets: Reconciling EVA with REVA 
In its basic interpretation, performance measurement under an EVA regime decouples the 
budgeting process from compensation when the incentive system pays managers to generate 
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an indefinite but positive EVA. However, EVA-based incentive programs of most companies 
pay managers not only to generate a positive EVA but also for improvements in EVA.  
In the first case, an incentive payment is earned only if a period’s observed EVA is posi-
tive. This might prevent manager-agents to implement projects with an overall positive net 
present value if the first periods’ EVA are negative, e.g. because of high investments inducing 
a high capital charge and low income, and if the agent discounts the stream of EVAs with a 
higher discount rate than the principal, i.e. if the agent takes a myopic perspective compared to 
the principal 
It has been formally shown (Baldenius/Fuhrmann/Reichelstein, 1999), that  
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Therefore, the sum of discounted changes in EVA (EVA) is proportionate with the strictly 
positive factor rq
-1
 to the sum of discounted EVA representing a project’s net present value. 
This alleviates the problem of the myopic agents but does not lead to a first best-level of in-
vestment.  
For companies that implement such kind of compensation scheme, it is necessary to de-
fine expected EVA improvements in terms of EVA targets. It has turned out that a proper set-
ting of those expected EVA improvements is vital for a successful implementation of EVA-
based compensation plans particularly in multi-business enterprises. The division performance 
in creating value contributions (on one side) and the incentive which is finally rewarded ac-
cording to the achievements (on the other side) have to be linked depending on the particular 
conditions of the respective line of business. Especially because of differing current EVA lev-
els and/or industry features, an appropriate assessment of performance is also always a matter 
of comparing several outcomes in consideration of the underlying business characteristics. As 
a case in point, it is obvious that the lower the current EVA level of a particular business unit 
is, the higher are potential EVA improvements, ceteris paribus. In other words, divisional 
management could enhance their prospects for improvements just by reducing the current 
EVA as compensation reference for EVA improvements (known as “big-bath-accounting”). 
Furthermore, a company-wide definition of EVA targets in a multi-industry enterprise has to 
be aware of possibly varying market growth opportunities in different industries, since they 
determine EVA growth prospects fundamentally. 
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In the application of the described compensation approach, the issue for any company is 
how to determine a fair EVA improvement rate used as compensation base in a given context. 
Privately owned companies given, one approach is to conduct benchmarking studies to iden-
tify the potential of improvements by comparing its results on a series of measures with those 
of peers. In contrast, the way performance standards are established in publicly traded compa-
nies is influenced by the fact that stock prices are driven by expectations.  
The equity value of a given stock can be seen as the present value of all future cash flows 
to equity as they are expected by the market. Conceptually, the relation between equity value 
and cash flows to equity exists also in the EVA approach.  
It can be shown that the present value of all future EVAs equals the MVA that provides a 
present value measure of wealth created for investors and represents the difference between 
the market value of a firm and its book value. 
Consequently, shareholders expected EVA improvements are impounded in the com-
pany’s share price. Which level of EVAs and, thus, which magnitude of improvement would 
be necessary to ultimately justify the current market value of a firm? 
Let us assume that MVA can be computed as 
0)10(
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In a perpetuity model MVA represents the market expectations of a constant stream of future 
EVAs* with 
r
EVA
MVAt
*
)11(   
Exhibit 3 provides an example in which the conjunction between MVA and EVA* is shown, 
assuming a stock-listed division. The example shows in the first column, that there is a con-
stant stream of EVAs required (EVA* = 100) to pursue today’s implicit expectations of the 
stock market. Since the current EVA is assumed to be 0, the necessary EVA improvement is 
100 in order to materialize the given expectations. A market value oriented compensation plan 
would target a corresponding EVA improvement. Now suppose the division management 
could re-deploy the 1000 in capital and an expected future growth potential of the investment 
would cause the market value to go to 3000.  
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 Today Immediately 
after Investment 
Book Value of Equity 1000 1000 
Market Value of Equity 2000 3000 
MVA 1000 2000 
Current EVA 0 0 
EVA* (WACC 10%) 100 200 
 
Exhibit 3: EVA/MVA Perpetuity Model 
In Exhibit 3, the second column shows the impact on MVA and EVA*. If EVA* were used as 
a basis for compensation purposes, the investment would not be taken because it would rise 
the EVA target to 200. In fact, the contrary effect would exist that the more valuable the busi-
ness idea, the higher the market value would rise and the higher the EVA targets would be-
come. In other words, managers would avoid systematically an engagement in highly valued 
projects. Thus, if EVA* is used as target profit in investment centers, it could result in a repli-
cation of REVA with all its unfortunate consequences.  
It can be shown in general that an EVA-oriented compensation which is focused on share 
price-based expectations is equivalent to a REVA-oriented compensation plan, verified below.  
Proposition: Deriving EVA targets from a firm’s observed market value is equivalent to a 
REVA performance measurement regime. 
Proof:  Deriving EVA targets implies according to conditions (10) and (11) 
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  q.e.d. 
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This implies that the dysfunctional effects shown in section 4 with regards to REVA can be 
extended also to a regime of strictly positive EVA-targets. 
6 Conclusion 
In our paper we compare different types of book value-based vs. market value-based residual 
income measurement (EA, REVA, REI). We provide a detailed analysis on the information 
provided by these performance measure. With regards to the incentive effects, we focus more 
closely on comparison of REVA vs. EVA. We show that REVA could result in either under-
investment in projects with a positive net present value or over-investment in projects with a 
negative net present value, both compared to EVA. Finally, we discuss the possibility of using 
the MVA to derive EVA targets for investment centers. We prove that with an infinite horizon 
these targets equal the application of REVA. 
Bibliography 
Bacidore, Jeffrey M./Bequist, John A./Milbourn, Todd T./Thakor, Anjan V. (1997): The 
Search for the Best Financial Performance Measure. In: Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 
53, p. 13-20. 
Baldenius, Tim/Fuhrmann, Gregor/Reichelstein, Stefan (1999): Zurück zu EVA. In: Betriebs-
wirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Vol. 51, pp. 48-52. 
Bromwich, Michael/Walker, M. (1998): Residual income past and future. In: Management 
Accounting Research, Vol. 9, pp. 391-419. 
Fisher, Irving (1906): The Nature of Capital and Income, New York: Macmillan. 
Hax, Herbert (1989): Investitionsrechnung und Periodenerfolgsmessung. In: Delfmann, Wer-
ner et al. (Eds.): Der Integrationsgedanke in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre. Helmut Koch 
zum 70. Geburtstag, Wiesbaden: Gabler, pp. 153-170. 
Hicks, John R. (1946): Value and Capital: An Inquiry into some Fundamental Principles of 
Economic Theory, 2
nd
 ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Laux, Helmut (1999): Unternehmensrechnung, Anreiz und Kontrolle: Die Messung, Zurech-
nung und Steuerung des Erfolges als Grundprobleme der Betriebswirtschaftslehre, 2
nd
 
ed., Berlin et al.: Springer. 
 - 17 - 
 
Lücke, Wolfgang (1955): Investitionsrechnung auf der Basis von Ausgaben oder Kosten?. In: 
Zeitschrift für handelswissenschaftliche Forschung - Neue Folge, Vol. 7, pp. 310-324. 
Neus, Werner (1998): Einführung in die Betriebswirtschaftslehre aus institutionenökonomi-
scher Sicht, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Preinreich, Gabriel (1937): Valuation and Amortization. In: The Accounting Review, Vol. 12, 
pp. 209-235. 
Reichelstein, Stefan (1997): Investment Decisions and Managerial Performance Evaluation. 
In: RAS Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 2, pp. 157-180. 
Reichelstein, Stefan (2000): Providing Managerial Incentives: Cash Flows versus Accrual Ac-
counting. In: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, pp. 243-269. 
Richter, Frank/Honold, Dirk (2000): Das Schöne, das Unattraktive und das Hässliche an EVA 
& Co. In: Finanz Betrieb, Vol. 2, pp. 265-274. 
Stewart, G. Bennett (1991): Quest for Value: The EVA
TM
 Management Guide, New York: 
Harper Business. 
Stewart, G. Bennett (1994): EVA
TM
: Fact and Fantasy. In: Journal of Applied Corporate Fi-
nance, Vol. 7(2), pp. 71-84. 
Stern, Joel M./Shiely, John S./Ross, Irwin (2001): The EVA Challenge, New York: Wiley. 
 
 
